20 April 2013

New climate policy course needed as EU carbon trading flagship sinks

The European Union’s Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the world’s largest carbon market, and the model for similar schemes in California and worldwide. But it has hit the rocks and should be replaced, writes Oscar Reyes.

The Emissions Trading System (ETS) is the European Union’s flagship climate policy and it is sinking fast.

The stated aim behind the ill-fated “cap and trade” scheme was to set an overall legal limit on greenhouse gas emissions (a “cap”) and then grant industries a certain number of licenses to pollute (“emissions allowances”). Companies that do not meet their cap can buy permits from others that have a surplus (“a trade”). The idea is that a scarcity of permits to pollute should encourage their price to rise; and the resulting additional cost to industry and power producers should then encourage them to pollute less.

But for seven of the eight years in which the EU ETS has been in operation, the number of allowances circulating has exceeded the “cap” – a result of corporate lobbying, large offset allowances that allow companies to buy cheaper emissions credits from beyond the EU, and the effects of the economic downturn. As a result, the carbon price has collapsed. Today, it reached record lows of €2.62 (compared with highs of around €32).

The latest collapse follows a European Commission proposal to re-float the scheme involved delaying (“backloading”) planned auctions of carbon allowances, making them temporarily more scarce in order to sure up carbon prices in the short term. The European Parliament rejected this, with center-right Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) from across the continent voting against the measure. Their stated aim was to avoid market “intervention,” but their scarcely concealed intent was to give European industry a free ride from climate obligations.

Conservatives are not alone in their objections. Increasing numbers of non-governmental organizations, and some left-of-center MEPs are also calling for the ETS to be scrapped. “The vote on backloading is the wrong debate,” according to Hannah Mowat from FERN, an NGO specialized in forest policy. “No amount of structural tinkering will get away from the fact that the EU has chosen the wrong tool to reduce emissions in Europe. It is inherently too weak to get the EU to where it needs to be in the necessary timescale.” In short, it’s no use reaching for some buckets when we should be heading for the lifeboats.

These criticisms face particular opprobrium from those who believe that the only realistic course is to “save” the ETS. Opponents are treated as “useful idiots” playing right into the hands of those opposed to any climate legislation. But eight years on, and several reforms later, the ETS is still failing to reduce emissions, and at the same time has even rewarded polluters with large subsidies. Why should we expect different results from doing the same thing over and over again?

Saying “no” to the ETS is not the end of the story. It’s simply a way of refusing a forced choice, rejecting the terms of a debate that falls between rejecting legislation to address climate change and pursuing a policy that has been shown to achieve nothing. In Europe, we’ve already seen how “protecting” emissions trading has been used as an excuse to water down energy efficiency policies, which would be far more effective in reducing emissions. Emissions trading also contradicts policies like feed-in tariffs which, when applied correctly, create far better price incentives to stimulate the uptake of renewable energy.

Scrapping the ETS does not mean that climate policy will fall into a vacuum. Energy policy is largely controlled by EU member states rather than the Commission itself, and there are important lessons to be shared at a national level. Germany’s Energy Transition (Energiewende) has seen the share of renewable energy rise from 6 to 25 per cent over 10 years, with the biggest shifts driven by community and local investment rather than the energy multinationals. This has not been driven by the ETS, but rather by a guarantee that renewables will gain access to electricity grids, providing certainty for investors.

At the EU level, the Commission should re-focus on securing more ambitious climate targets now that “backloading” is dead in the water. Removing the ability to circumvent domestic action by buying carbon offsets would help considerably with that goal.

There are significant lessons, too, for other states that are considering emissions trading. Attempts to patch up the ETS ignore the schemes more fundamental failings. These start with the very notion of abstracting “carbon” as a tradablecommodity, which frames climate change as a problem of cost adjustments that can be managed by a market that is assumed to allocate goods efficiently, rather than as a historically embedded problem of the dominant fossil fuel-based development model.

Ultimately, the EU and other industrialized countries need to massively reduce its overall consumption of energy, including its outsourced emissions, which have continued to rise irrespective of emissions trading. This doesn’t require “flagship” emissions trading schemes, but rather a sea-change in our thinking about how policymakers can help to address climate change.

 A version of this article was first published by the EU Observer.

12 April 2013

What's the private sector up to on "climate finance" and what are the issues with that?

Climate policymakers are now exploring ways to encourage private sector finance for climate action in developing countries, i.e. investment in projects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and build capacity to adapt to climate change impacts. 

Here's a paper I wrote for the UK Bond Development and Environment Group on these issues. It examines the evidence from existing channelling of development and climate finance via private sector instruments to identify the probable risks and benefits of such approaches. The particular aim of this paper is to stimulate debate within the UK context.

Download here or here.

23 November 2012

What Next: Climate, Development and Equity

A copy of this arrived in my post box yesterday.


It can arrive in yours too if you contact info [at] whatnext.org, or request via the website of the Dag Hammerskjold Foundation.

That site also offers a free download, as does the What Next Forum.

I've contributed a chapter on carbon trading, which surveys the latest in the EU Emissions Trading System and the (near-)collapse of the Clean Development Mechanism, as well as explaining how carbon is actually traded.

There are many excellent chapters. I'm still working my way through, but Kevin Anderson's chapter (based on a talk that you can listen to and watch a slideshow of here), and Dale Wen's article on China.

Full contents are:

Foreword John Vidal

Introduction Niclas Hällström

Part I » Setting the Context – Climate, Development and Equity Challenges

Climate change going beyond dangerous – Brutal numbers and tenuous hope
Kevin Anderson............................................................................... 16

Climate debt – A primer
Matthew Stilwell.............................................................................. 41

The North-South divide, equity and development – The need for trust-building for emergency mobilisation
Sivan Kartha, Tom Athanasiou and Paul Baer.................................... 47

Part II » The Climate Negotiations

A clash of paradigms – UN climate negotiations at a crossroads
Martin Khor ...................................................................................76

Why Bolivia stood alone in opposing the Cancun climate agreement
Pablo Solón................................................................................... 106

‘The Great Escape III’
Pablo Solón................................................................................... 108

What happened in Durban?......................................................... 110

Weak ambitions and loopholes.....................................................115

India and Africa at COP 17 – The false dichotomy of ‘survival vs.development’
Sivan Kartha...................................................................................118

Climate finance – How much is needed?
Matthew Stilwell............................................................................ 120

China and climate change – Spin, facts and realpolitik
Dale Jiajun Wen............................................................................. 125

Climate change, equity and development – India’s dilemmas
Praful Bidwai................................................................................. 147

Part III » What Next? – On Real and False Solutions

Climate as investment – Dead and living solutions
Larry Lohmann............................................................................. 164

What goes up must come down – Carbon trading, industrial subsidies and capital market governance
Oscar Reyes...................................................................................185

Darken the sky and whiten the earth – The dangers of geoengineering
ETC Group – Pat Mooney, Kathy Jo Wetter and Diana Bronson....... 210

Ecological agriculture, climate resilience and adaptation – A roadmap
Doreen Stabinsky and Lim Li Ching.............................................. 238

A global programme to tackle energy access and climate change
Tariq Banuri and Niclas Hällström................................................. 264

Reclaiming power – An energy model for people and the planet
Pascoe Sabido and Niclas Hällström............................................... 280

Part IV » Movement Towards Change

Beyond patzers and clients – Strategic reflections on climate change and the 'Green Economy'
Larry Lohmann............................................................................. 295

Civil society strategies and the Stockholm syndrome
Pat[zer] Mooney............................................................................ 327

Leaving the oil in the soil – Communities connecting to resist oil extraction and climate change
Nnimmo Bassey............................................................................. 332

Riding the wave – How Transition Towns are changing the world and having fun
Teresa Anderson............................................................................. 340

Contributors................................................................................. 348

Glossary....................................................................................... 352


 

17 June 2012

Blogging and tweeting from Rio+20

I'll be blogging for the Institute for Policy Studies from Rio+20.

My first post, asking "What's at Stake with the Green Economy" is now online here. It claims that simply obtaining measures to implement the commitments made 20 years ago would be better than creating any new corporate-driven initiatives or issuing yet more empty promises.

The post also highlights and links to some key reading ahead of the Rio Summit.

I'd also recommend following the blogs from the World Development Movement.

And finally... I appear to be the latest victim to succumb to twitter, where I'm tweeting from #Rioplus20 as @_oscar_reyes

07 June 2012

World Bank Group Environment Strategy 2012 – 2022 at first glance

Rather than waiting on the outcomes of Rio+20, the World Bank has announced just announced it’s new environment strategy for the next decade. The full document can be downloaded here. Here are some very rough notes, on first reading, for anyone who's interested in this type of thing:
  • There seems to be a very weak interconnection between the Bank's environment strategy and its “core infrastructure business,” beyond some waffley rhetoric. Further work is needed to see how the environment strategy maps onto and relates to Bank’s energy and infrastructure strategies.
  • The Strategy assumes a continuing (expanded?) role for the Climate Investment Fundss – with no “sunset” in sight. By way of background, these controversial funds were started with a "sunset clause," which should mean that they disappear once a Green Climate Fund is up and running.
  • Wealth Accounting and Valuation of Ecosystem Services (WAVES) is the first of 7 strategic focusses identified in the Strategy. The Bank looks set to push policy advice that “focuses on the value of natural capital and integration of “green accounting” in more conventional development planning analysis. ” Very briefly, this approach looks to have elements of a positive framing (moving beyond GDP as a measure) but is ultimately wound back into a policy-promotion framework that encourages the financialisation of nature. The WAVES framework (the first phase of which is funded by the UK’s DfID) is something the Bank looks keen to launch at Rio, in the form of proposing “an international program of action on Ecosystem Accounting” at the Summit.
  • “Blue carbon” (relating to coastal regions and wetlands) is increasingly a part of the Bank’s “green” agenda; while soil carbon is a critical concern for the Bank’s work in Africa.
  • There’s a lot on REDD (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation) and some “innovations” to support REDD are foreseen. These include “wildlife premiums” (Zoellick’s proposal from Cancun on “charistmatic species”) as well as instruments (including bonds) that could support a REDD market in the current context of virtually non-existent demand for credits
  • Despite the obvious failings of carbon markets, the Bank shows no sign of retreat (it currently holds a $2.7 billion portfolio of carbon funds). Quite the opposite, in fact: “Developing access to carbon finance for low-income countries will be the centerpiece of the WBG’s strategy.” (p.61). The Bank envisages a 3-fold approach: (1) encouraging policies and simplified regulations to “accelerate speed to market” (irrespective of contradictions with environmental integrity); support for developing countries’ development of “capacity, technical knowledge, and carbon market infrastructure”; and support for “building up the potential supply for a scaled-up future carbon market” so as to “avoid possible future market dysfunctions resulting from supply shortages. ” Setting aside all of the major critiques of carbon markets for a moment, this is quite an extraordinary and unjustified focus given the obvious over-supply problems that the market faces.
  • The WB highlights the following carbon funds as key in moving forwards: Carbon Partnership Facility (including support for sectoral approaches), Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (REDD readiness), Partnership for Market Readiness (piloting new market instruments, and “increasingly... examining the possibilities for carbon trading between domestic markets on a bilateral or multilateral basis. ”); BioCarbon Fund Tranche 3 (BioCF T3) (next generation): (including developing new methodologies for forestry and agriculture); Carbon Initiative for Development (CI-Dev) (capacity building, technical assistance, and financing to the seller entities behind the programs).
  • This confirms a trend that’s already been apparent for the last couple of years – namely, that the Bank is shifting it’s emphasis beyond project-based funding to support new market infrastructures across whole economic sectors, plus putting guarantees/funding to the investors (rather than purchasing credits directly).
  • The IFC is becoming more involved in climate-related activities. “While the IFC’s investment and advisory work in energy efficiency, renewable energy, and resource efficiency will remain the mainstay of its climate change activities, it also aims to grow its Cleantech venture investment portfolio. ... The IFC is working on several initiatives to mobilize commercial and concessional funding to support private sector climate investments in the form of equity, debt, and technical assistance.” It will also build on its post-2012 Carbon facility (which targets European utilities and energy companies).
  • Carbon neutral greenwashing is being upscaled (p.63) : “As with the headquarters, the carbon emissions of country offices will also be offset, along with emissions from staff travel. ”
  • Climate risk insurance (p.64) is likely to form a key part of the Bank’s adaptation agenda

01 June 2012

UK aid to Morocco will fund electricity for Europe

Money taken from the UK aid budget is to be used by the World Bank to finance the Ouarzazate solar project, designed to prioritise export to Europe rather than to ensure that ordinary Moroccans can access affordable electricity.

The project is part funded the World Bank’s Clean Technology Fund, which receives 14 per cent of its money - or £385 million – from the UK overseas aid budget.

Investment in renewable energy is essential to the fight against climate change. But measures to tackle climate change will only work if they also address poverty and inequality. By setting in place an export-led model that is likely to see electricity costs for the Moroccan people increase, and by asking the Moroccan government to subsidise the creation of a risky mega-project, Ouarzazate could make it more difficult for ordinary Moroccans to access electricity, especially in rural areas. And yet the project is being funded from the UK’s overseas aid project, the very purpose of which is to reduce poverty.

You can read this new report, published by the World Development Movement, by following this link.

It's the second in a series called Power to the People?, looking at the World Bank's Clean Tech Fund. The first report, on a wind project in Mexico, can be found here.


31 May 2012

World Bank State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2012: market growth is more spin than substance

The World Bank's annual State and Trends of the Carbon Market report is out, and can be found here:

It's a very useful source of data which, like all WB stuff, needs to be treated with caution. The spin is all about a growing carbon market, rising to $176 billion, an 11% increase on the previous year's figures for 2010. (see, for example, how Reuters picked it up) However, it is worth noting that :
  • The largest proportion of the "carbon market growth" is accounted for by a change in how the World Bank counts the figures, the explanation for which is buried in an annex: “Instead of using external data, however, in 2012 the authors calculated the volumes and values for 2010... . The calculation resulted in higher volumes and values, particularly for EUA and secondary CER transactions. Instead of the global carbon market of US$142 billion reported in 2010, the revised calculations resulted in a global carbon market that is greater by about US$17 billion year on year (yoy). A higher value in the EUA market accounted for about US$14 billion, 80% of the difference. This year’s calculation also resulted in a secondary CER market greater by US$2 billion in 2010 yoy. The remaining differ- ence is explained by the value of the post-2012 CER transactions, not reported last year, which reached over US$1 billion in 2010. ” (p.124) 
  • That said, the market still grew a bit, and the reason given for that is a rise in hedging and speculative trades: “Trading volumes soared in 2011, coinciding with the second decline in verified emissions in three years. A considerable portion of the trades is primarily motivated by hedging, portfolio adjustments, profit taking, and arbitrage." (there's quite a useful box explaining this around p.39) 
  • It's also worth noticing that the Bank has massaged the figures to overcome the embarrassment of a shrinking CDM Last year's "primary" CDM market (ie. the value of the credits generated by projects; rather than the cumulative value of further trading in these credits) was $900 million, the lowest ever (comparisons below - figures in US$billions) 
    2011
    0.9
    2010
    1.5
    2009
    2.7
    2008
    6.5
    2007
    7.4
    2006
    5.8
    2005
    2.6
  • The Bank then boosts this figure by adding another $1.9 billion for forward pCER post-2012" value - "call options" on credits that are not yet issued. Put simply, it's counting an option to buy a credit that does not yet exist as part of the value of the CDM. A lot of carbon is actually traded this way, although the press doesn't exactly get very far in explaining this. But the real massaging of the figures is revealed here (p.49) : “without a brighter market outlook, it is unlikely that a substantial proportion of these post-2012 ERPAs will be exercised at the indicative prices and volumes established in these documents. ” (ie. the figures written to Emissions Reduction Purchase Agreements, which are the basis for this $1.9 billion, would generally - I'd wager almost exclusively - mean that options would not be taken up with CDM credits going for less than €3.50 per ton, as at present). 
  • With the CDM, too, the story is one of greater financialisation. The biggest trade in CDM credits passes through the UK and Switzerland (where a lot of the financial intermediaries are based "Entities in the UK transacted the largest share, accounting for 47Mt or 39% of pre-2013 pCERs and 44Mt or 26% of post-2012 pCERs. The primary catalyst for this was the high concentration of buyers in the UK. However, a large portion of these vol-umes are known to be redistributed upon deliv-ery. Switzerland had a robust increase in 2010 and in 2011 in both pre-2013 and post-2012 markets compared to previous years. The Swiss market share came right after the UK, for the same reasons as the latter." (p.55)